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John Warwick Montgomery, Ph.D., D. Théol., LL.D., Purcellville, Virginia / USA 
 
The Justification of Homeschooling Vis-A-Vis the European Human Rights 
System 
 
Abstract: The very idea of the European Convention on Human Rights is to bring the laws of 
contracting states into line with fundamental human rights principles. Where the Convention is 
not explicit, the Court should never rule restrictively so as to reduce the scope of a general right. 
In the case of homeschooling, the Convention sets forth the general principle that “the state shall 
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical  convictions.” It must  not,  therefore, allow a contracting state to 
eliminate a means of achieving this desired by parents—unless the state can show that the means 
in question is ineffective.  
Keywords: Homeschooling, home education, human rights, European Court, ECHR, parental 
rights, educational freedom 
 
I. Introduction 
The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  has  taken  no  official  position  on  the  legitimacy  of 
homeschooling, so it may appear premature to raise the question in that context. However, a 
related case, brought by parents to the Strasbourg Court in 2003 against the German government 
was declared inadmissible in 2006, and the unpublished opinion suggests that Strasbourg does 
not view the choice of homeschooling as a parental or a children’s right. The opinion reads in 
part: 
 
The Court observes . . . that there appears to be no consensus among the Contracting States with 
regard to compulsory attendance of primary schools. While some countries permit home education, 
other States provide for compulsory attendance of its State or private schools.  
 
In  the  present  case,  the  Court  notes  that  the  German  authorities  and  courts  have  carefully 
reasoned their decisions and mainly stressed the fact that not only the acquisition of knowledge, 
but also the integration into and first experience with society are important goals in primary 
school education. The German courts found that those objectives cannot be equally met by home 
education even if it allowed children to acquire the same standard of knowledge as provided for 2 
by primary school education. The Court considers this presumption as not being erroneous and as 
falling within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation which they enjoy in setting up and 
interpreting  rules  for  their  education  systems.  The  Federal  Constitutional  Court  stressed  the 
general  interest  of  society  to  avoid  the  emergence  of  parallel  societies  based  on  separate 
philosophical convictions and the importance of integrating minorities into society.
1 
Even though these remarks create no  precedent for subsequent cases before the Strasbourg 
Court,  and  even  though  the  waters  were  clearly  muddied  in  this  application  by  applicants’ 
arguments based on their opposition to “sex education [and] the appearance of mythical creatures 
such as witches and dwarfs in fairytales during school lessons,”
2 it is clear that the issue of 
homeschooling  will  not  go  away  in  the  European  context—especially  owing  to  the  almost 
fanatical opposition to it on the part of governmental authorities in Germany and Sweden. We 
therefore see the matter as worthy of treatment here. 
Let us begin with larger—more abstract and philosophical—aspects of the problem before 
analyzing the issue in the European human rights context. 
 
II. Philosophical Considerations and Their Relevance to Homeschooling 
There are three major positions possible in justifying homeschooling or in opposing it. One may 
take  the  libertarian  view:  the  State  has  no  right  (or  a  very  minimal  right)  to  determine  the 
conduct  of  its  citizenry,  and  therefore  parents  or  children  desiring  homeschooling  should  be 
allowed to practice that educational method if they so desire.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, there is the statist view: the State knows best and 
freedom of individual decision is allowable only where the State does not legislate. If, therefore, 
the State prohibits homeschooling, that is its right and the end of the matter.  
Over against these two philosophies of individual-versus-State action, one encounters the 
approach of John Locke: there are “certain inalienable rights” possessed by individuals which 
neither the State, nor even the person herself, should be allowed to take away. Locke’s viewpoint, 
based on historic Christian belief and biblical teaching concerning the creation of man in God’s 
                                                           
1 Konrad and Others v.Germany, Application No. 35504/03 (11 September 2006),  7–8. It must be emphasised that 
this is an unpublished opinion, not appearing in the HUDOC database, and therefore does not constitute any kind of 
legal precedent, internationally or nationally. No homeschooling case appears in the authoritative list of cases dealing 
with “Le Droit à l’Instruction (Article 2 du Protocole no. 1)” in Vincent Berger, Jurisprudence de la Cour 
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme (11th ed.; Paris: Sirey/Dalloz, 2009),  625–43. 
2 Ibid,  2. 3 
image,  deeply  influenced  the  American  founding  documents  (especially  the  Declaration  of 
Independence) and served as background for the modern human rights movement.
3  
If, however, the Lockean position is seen as superior to the libertarian and the statist 
philosophies, the question immediately arises:  what  is  the  specific  content  of  those  rights 
deserving to be protected as inalienable? In terms of homeschooling, does the State’s concern for 
the education of the citizenry constitute the right to prohibit homeschooling? Or does a parent’s 
concern to ensure the best education for his offspring justify homeschooling as an inalienable 
right? And suppose the child wishes to be homeschooled: does the child have an absolute right to 
decide on the education she should have? 
As for the State’s right to educate, an important distinction needs to be made. One may well 
be able to argue that a properly educated populace is essential to a functioning State—particularly 
if  one  is  thinking  in  terms  of  modern,  representative  democracies.  But  even  if  that  right  is 
conceded, it does not follow that the State has the right (a) to indoctrinate or (b) to determine and 
delimit the methods of educational instruction. As for indoctrination,  
 
In matters of educational instruction the state must respect the philosophical and religious opinions of 
each person and this obligation applies equally in public and in private education. This requirement 
was included in the Protocol [No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights] as a result of 
clear evidence that during the Second World War totalitarian regimes had a powerful tendency to 
impose  their  ideological  propaganda  on  the  young,  notably  through  cutting  them  off  from  the 
influence of their parents. Article 2 [of Protocol 1] therefore prohibits all forms of indoctrination of 
the young in the educational system and the parents themselves have the responsibility to see that this 
prohibition  is  carried  out.  It  follows  that  the  state’s  obligation  to  respect  the  philosophical  and 
religious convictions of the parents prohibits all forms of indoctrination by the state.
4 
 
The Protocol referred to here reads as follows: 
 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in 
relation  to  education  and  to  teaching,  the  state  shall  respect  the  right  of  parents  to  ensure  such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions. 
 
It is worth pointing out that “indoctrination” need not (and in our modern, secular era, often is 
not) limited to sectarian religious ideas. Thus, were a state to impose “civil religion” (to employ 
                                                           
3 Cf. John Warwick Montgomery, Human Rights and Human Dignity, 2d ed. (Calgary, Alberta: Canadian Institute 
for Law, Theology and Public Policy, 1995), passim. 
4 Jean-Loup Charrier (ed.), Code de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme (Paris: Litec, 2005),  229 (our 
translation). Cited authority: Graeme v. United Kingdom, Application No. 13887/88 (5 February 1990, before the 
Commission), DR 64/158. 4 
sociologist Robert Bellah’s expression) on its populace, this should be seen to run contrary to the 
European Convention—examples: teaching only an atheistic cosmology by refusing to present 
intelligent design as a legitimate alternative; teaching only Darwinian evolutionary theory as if it 
were scientific fact and not subject to serious scientific criticism. A religion of secularism is as 
capable of indoctrination as traditional religious and denominational views—indeed, even more 
so today in our officially pluralist, but in fact very conformist times. 
The Convention Protocol just quoted appears to defer to parental authority in the matter of 
education. Does this suggest that the parent has the inalienable right to determine the educational 
content and method for the instruction of her children? Surely not. Parents with anti-scientific 
convictions  relating  to  the  care  of  the  body  (e.g.  Christian  Scientists  who  oppose  ordinary 
medical  treatment,  Jehovah’s  Witnesses  who  will  not  allow  blood  transfusion)  are  not  able 
legally to keep their children from essential medical help. Likewise, the State has the right to 
establish minimal educational standards and to insist that all children conform to them. A parent 
who believes that his child will be hurt by mathematical instruction—or who wants him taught 
only the color blue—will not receive any support from the law. 
And  the  child  himself?  Does  the  child,  as  subject  of  the  educational  process,  have  an 
inalienable right to determine the content and nature of that process? One might suppose so on 
the basis of a superficial application of the fundamental theme of the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
Children Act 1989 and the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child—that “the best 
interests of the child” must be determinative. But those instruments clearly recognize that the 
child’s wishes are not always equivalent to the child’s best interests.
5 On the one hand, a child, 
owing to her immaturity, is not necessarily in a position to make reasonable or the best choices.
6  
Moreover, it is noteworthy that in the mature legal systems of today, adults, no less than 
children, are limited in their choice of conduct: they cannot do an ything and everything they 
wish—even when the desired action would not harm others. Two examples are pertinent, one in 
the French, the other in the U.K. legal system. The “midget tossing” (lancer de nains) case in 
                                                           
5 Cf. Andrew Bainham, Children: The Modern Law, 3d. rev. ed. (Bristol, England: Jordan Publishing/Family Law, 
2005), especially 37 ff. and 70–72. 
6 A short but stimulating discussion of the philosophical issues pertaining to children’s rights, including a treatment 
of “will theory” vs. MacCormick’s sophisticated version of the “interest theory” of rights, may be found in Samuel 
Stoljar’s An Analysis of Rights (London: Macmillan, 1984), 117–20. Stoljar suggests that the best justification of 
children’s rights lies in “our human endeavour to replenish the human community.” The inadequacy of this notion 
becomes immediately evident when we think of societies suffering from overpopulation or from inadequate natural 
resources: would we favor, for example, China’s “one-child policy”—or a state’s effort to control population by 
giving more rights to male children than to female children? 5 
France involved a recreational pursuit in which dwarfs were competitively thrown into nets; the 
dwarfs  were  paid,  were  not  injured,  and  wished  to  continue  doing  this.  The  highest  French 
administrative court (Conseil d’Etat) ruled that the activity was an affront to the dignity of the 
human person and considered it irrelevant that the dwarfs did not themselves believe that their 
dignity was compromised.
7 The case was then taken to Strasbourg, but the Court declared it 
inadmissible, upholding the Conseil d’Etat judgment.
8 In the U.K., the famous “sado-masochist” 
case  was  decided  along  the  same  lines.  The  court  ruled  that  sado-masochistic  homosexual 
encounters  occasioning  actual  bodily  harm,  even  when  consensual,  were  contrary  to  public 
morals  and  human  values,  and  would  not  be  permitted.
9  This case was also unsuccessfully 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights.
10 
Our conclusion at this point must be that neither the State, nor the parent, nor even the child 
has an unfettered right to determine educational content or method of instruction. 
 
III. The European Court and Homeschooling 
It is of more than passing interest that many of the articles of the European Convention are 
organized in two parts: Paragraph 1 sets forth the given right and Paragraph 2 allows limited 
qualification of that right by the State. Thus Article 9 (on religious freedom) states in Paragraph 1 
that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”—and thus the right 
to worship, engage in public and private religious practices, and to change one’s religion. This is 
followed by Paragraph 2 which indicates possible but limited exceptions: those “necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
The important point here is that the right precedes the limitations. In other words, the Court 
should on principle uphold the right unless and until it can be shown that a legitimate limitation 
exists  to  qualify  that  right.  The  limitations  must  never  be  allowed  to  swallow  up  the  rights 
themselves.  
                                                           
7 Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, arrêt de 27 octobre 1995 (Rec. Lebon, p. 372). The case is particularly important 
because it established in French law that the dignity of the human person must be classed within the very concept of 
the Ordre public. 
8 Wackenheim v. France, Application No. 29961/96 (16 October 1996, before the Commission); the inadmissibility 
decision was unanimous. 
9 R v. Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75. 
10 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v.United Kingdom [1997], Case No. 109/1995/615/703–705. 6 
There is no question that the Convention-guaranteed right of education is to be exercised by 
the State—in  the sense  that the State has  the responsibility to  establish  minimal  educational 
standards and to see that they are maintained. But does this mean that the State has the right to 
determine—and  limit—the  permissible  methods  by  which  such  educational  goals  can  be 
achieved? We argue that this is not the case. 
The State has the right to insist on proper safety standards for travel. But who would argue 
that the State could therefore properly limit the means of transportation the public can use—
monocycles, not bicycles; three-wheeled vehicles, not four-wheeled vehicles, etc.? The State can 
(and should) establish minimum standards for safe vehicles on the road, and owners should have 
to have their means of transport tested against those standards, but it is hardly appropriate for the 
State to tell the populace what kind of vehicle they can or cannot use. 
In  the  case  of  homeschooling,  the  State  has  every  right  to  insist  that  the  child  reach 
minimum educational levels through the schooling he or she receives. Thus, examinations or 
other objective evidences of intellectual attainment need to be required of all children at the 
appropriate educational levels. But the means by which the educational level is attained should 
not be a concern of the State. Where it is, the State clearly goes beyond its proper sphere and 
unnecessarily restricts the freedom of action of its citizenry. 
In the Family H. v. United Kingdom case, Strasbourg significantly concluded: 
 
That to require the applicant parents to cooperate in the assessment of their children’s educational 
standards by an education authority in order to ensure a certain level of literacy and numeracy, whilst, 
nevertheless, allowing them to educate their children at home, cannot be said to constitute a lack of 
respect for the applicant’s rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.
11 
 
Comments a specialist: “It is interesting to note that the Commission does not attach so much 
weight to the form of the [primary] education, but rather to the responsibility of the State for its 
quality; a certain level of literacy and numeracy, leaving the rights of the parents unimpaired as 
much as possible.”
12 
A state, however, may well claim (and, as we have seen in the Konrad matter, has claimed) 
that homeschooling is socially deleterious: that the homeschooled child is socially deprived. The 
State goes on to argue that the child needs to be integrated into a pluralistic society and its values. 
                                                           
11 Family H. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 10233/83 (before the Commission), D&R 37 (1984), 106. 
12 P. van Dijk and G. J. H. van Hoof (eds.), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd 
ed. (The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1998),  646. 7 
But as to alleged “social deprivation,” the burden surely rests on the State to show that this is the 
case—a very difficult burden to discharge in light of the strong evidence of superior social skills 
on the part of homeschooled students in countries where homeschooling is permitted. 
As for “the general interest of society to avoid the emergence of parallel societies based on 
separate philosophical convictions and the importance of integrating minorities into society” (to 
employ  the  language  of  the  Konrad  inadmissibility  opinion),  this  surely  smacks  of  political 
correctness—not education—and appears to fall squarely under the axe of indoctrination—which, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  unqualifiedly  condemned  by  Protocol  1,  Article  2  of  the  European 
Convention. The function of an educational system is to bring the students to a proper level of 
knowledge,  not  to  force  them  into  a  particular  conception  of  society.  To  be  sure,  if 
homeschooling could be shown to contradict or denigrate the values of a democratic society, that 
would  be  sufficient  reason  to  oppose  it  in  that  form,  but,  again,  the  burden  of  proof  in 
demonstrating this should rest on the State, not on the student or his or her parents. 
It is also worth emphasizing that “pluralism” must not deprive the citizens of the right to 
oppose viewpoints (even popular viewpoints) that are in fact false or evil. Cannibalism as a 
pluralistic option would not be a good idea, even on the ground of tolerance. Slavery was a 
contested idea before the American Civil War and, fortunately, the solution, as represented by the 
Emancipation  Proclamation  and  amendments  to  the  United  States  Constitution,  was  not  to 
continue to tolerate both a slavery and an antislavery position on the question. A society must not 
become  conformist  to  the  point  of  not  allowing  homeschooling  because  the  students  are 
presented with values which may not jibe with what is regarded as officially kosher—so long as, 
one hastens to add, the students are confronted with the variety of value systems characteristic of 
the modern world and are given the opportunity to make their own decisions as to the value 
system they prefer.  
What  we have here is  not—though it may  superficially  appear to  be such—an issue of 
“conflicting human rights norms”: the State versus the individual.
13 There is nothing inherently in 
opposition between homeschooling and State interests—or between the rights of the child and the 
rights  of  the  State.  Potentially,  if  the  State  attempts  to  impose  a  “pluralistic”  value  system 
(whatever that means) on the family, or if the homeschooling is a covert attempt to undermine the 
society in which the child lives, there would indeed be an intolerable conflict. But there is no 
                                                           
13 No mention of the homeschooling problem appears in Eva Brems (ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights 
(Antwerp, Belgium: Intersentia, 2008). 8 
reason to suppose a priori that such conflicts exist, and if the State sticks to setting minimal 
educational standards—its proper function in this realm—and the homeschooling is educationally 
and socially responsible, there is no reason legally to refuse to allow it. And if the State believes 
that there is a problem, it is the State’s burden to demonstrate it. 
So, how should the European Court of Human Rights rule if and when a homeschooling case 
(uncontaminated by extrinsic considerations)
14 comes before it? 
  The starting point must surely be the Strasbourg Court’s existing acquaintance with and 
commitment to the notion of a “law above the law,” i.e., constitutional law and international law 
on a plane above ordinary legislation. The European Convention on Human Rights sets forth just 
such a higher law: a law taking precedence over ordinary, national legislation.  
But the European Convention establishes only the right to education; it does not specify or 
limit the means to achieve it. What, then? Should the Strasbourg Court give untrammeled control 
to the State to limit educational methodology? Surely, not. The State has the responsibility to 
ensure that, however children are educated, they reach the proper level—and any schooling that 
does not attain that result must certainly be improved, or if that is not possible, abolished (for 
example, substandard public or private schools or incompetent homeschooling). But the burden 
rests on the State to show that there is the need to do this. Assuming a priori that a particular 
method of education is faulty is a meritless solution and flies in the face of democratic values. 
Dr. Matthew Weait is undoubtedly correct when he writes: 
 
Contracting  states  [to  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights]  are  given  a  wide  margin  of 
appreciation to administer and finance their own systems of education. Successful challenges are 
likely  to  be  scarce  provided  the  system  is  both  efficient  and  sufficiently  flexible  to  permit  a 
reasonable measure of parental choice (through, for example, a diverse independent sector).
15 
 
That is precisely the problem. When homeschooling is denied, the system may be said to lack the 
proper degree of flexibility; a reasonable measure of parental choice is denied; and a diverse 
independent educational sector ceases to have realistic meaning.  
In spite of the great advances made by the European Court of Human Rights in bringing 
national  law  into  conformity  with  first-generation  human  rights  principles,  there  has  been  a 
                                                           
14 Cases must not be taken to Strasbourg that muddy the issue of the legitimacy of home schooling per se. Thus it is a 
great error to go to Strasbourg with cases where homeschooling is intermixed with sincere but off-the-wall religious, 
ethical, and philosophical viewpoints; alleged procedural failings by local educational, social work, or police 
authorities; disciplinary, marital, and family problems; etc.  
15 Matthew Weait, “Right to Education,” Human Rights Law and Practice, ed. Lord Lester of Herne Hill and David 
Pannick, 2d ed. (London: LexisNexis UK, 2004), sec. 4.20, 471. Italics ours. 9 
pusillanimous tendency on the Court’s part to defer to national legal systems where particularly 
controversial issues are at stake—for example, in the case of abortion, where the Court has left 
restrictions in place in conservative states but refused to mandate a right-to-life position in liberal 
countries.
16 Such an approach may be comprehensible on the ground that the Court needs to 
retain the confidence of the contracting states. However, the very idea of the  Convention is to 
bring the laws of contracting states into line with fundamental human rights principles. Where the 
Convention is not explicit, the Court should never rule restrictively so as to reduce the scope of a 
general right. In the case of homeschoo ling, the Convention (as we have seen) sets forth the 
general principle that “the state shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and 
teaching  in  conformity  with  their  own  religious  and  philosophical  convictions.”  It  must  not, 
therefore, allow a contracting state to eliminate a means of achieving this desired by parents—
unless the state can show that the means in question is ineffective.  
At the deepest level culturally, increasing secularism in modern society— particularly as 
manifested in Europe—poses special difficulties. The secular mindset can (as  in  the  Konrad 
opinion) lead courts to an unconscious acceptance of politically correct notions of educational 
“integration.”
17 Sadly, this also means that where constitutions and international human rights 
instruments are silent on an issue, the law will not appeal, as in the past, to the “higher law” as set 
out in the Holy Scriptures—the inalienable dignity of the human person, his family, and his 
personal  decision-making,  as  John  Locke  derived  these  rights  principally  from  biblical 
revelation—but  will  tend  to  defer  to  State  power  and  bureaucracy,  infused  by  prevailing 
pluralistic viewpoints. Where this occurs, the tragic result will be, not an increase in human rights 
protections but just the opposite. In that respect, the homeschooling issue may serve as a litmus 
test to discerning jurists.  
                                                           
16 “No consensus exists across Europe on the issue of abortion, and given the difficult moral and ethical issues 
involved, the Strasbourg organs have been understandably reluctant to pronounce substantively on whether the 
protection in art 2 [of the European Convention on Human Rights] for ‘everyone’ extends to the unborn child. In 
light of the differing national laws, a state will have a broad margin of appreciation with regard to the Convention on 
the issue of abortion” (Kay Taylor, “Right To Life,” ibid., sec. 4.2.17, 112). 
17 Michael Farris, chancellor of Patrick Henry College, has noted in a recent interview that a new wave of opposition 
to homeschooling seems to be on the horizon in the United States, based on the secular assumption that “Christian 
homeschooling parents are effectively transmitting values to their children that the elitists believe are dangerous to 
the well-being of both these very children and society as a whole.” In this connection, Farris cites law professors 
from Northwestern University, George Washington University, and Emory University who have called for a ban on 
religious education in both private and homeschooling contexts (Baptist Press, 23 February 2011: 
http://www.bpnews.net [accessed 23 February 2011]). Also, in the United States—and in Europe as well—the 
refusal in many quarters to allow intelligent design to be offered as an alternative theory to Darwinian evolutionary 
models bespeaks of political correctness and ideological orthodoxy replacing educational openness and curricular 
flexibility (cf. University of Montana Law Review, April 2007). 10 
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